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STOP, You’re on Camera: The Evidentiary 




Law is the tool defining the content of rights and obligations especially in demo-
cratic societies (Clark 1942). As part of this role, the branch of criminal law speci-
fies the actions and omissions that constitute crimes, along with their respective 
punishment, and describes the procedures that the State must follow in the investi-
gation and prosecution of persons accused of criminal offences, who are presumed 
innocent until proven guilty (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, art.11). 
Proving an accused’s guilt is generally the task of the State and occurs by furnishing 
“evidence”, which is “pertinent information sufficient to persuade the trier of fact to 
form a belief that the accused is guilty to some specified standard of certainty, tra-
ditionally expressed in criminal proceedings as ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’” 
(Roberts and Zuckerman 2010, p. 96).
The revolution in computing and telecommunication technologies has impacted 
criminal law. Computers and networks have become a target to criminals and one of 
the tools they use to commit or facilitate their crimes (McQuade 2006). These devel-
opments have created challenges to the law of evidence, which has relied upon the 
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technological neutrality of its doctrines to cope (Law Reform Commission 2009). 
Nevertheless, today’s advancement and widespread of mobile computing and wire-
less networks have created opportunities for evidence law (Byrne and Marx 2011). 
Sometimes, an individual captures a picture or video that proves useful in detecting 
a crime offender and/or proving her/his guilt (Rentschler 2016). This video or pic-
ture is digital evidence: “information and data of value to an investigation that is 
stored on, received, or transmitted by an electronic device” (National Institute of 
Justice 2008, p. ix). Evidence has increasingly become digital in nature and law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs), lawyers, and courts have increasingly encountered 
digital evidence issues in the course of their duties (Casey 2011). Yet, legal systems 
still apply the rules of traditional evidence to the issues raised by digital  records 
(Insa 2007). This is problematic given the difficulty associated with proving the 
authenticity and reliability of digital  records. Evidence is the cornerstone of any 
trial (Leroux 2004). It is therefore  important to ensure that a reasonable level of 
certainty exists with regard to its admissibility and probative value when it is digital. 
Also, it is important to equip digital community policing systems with the technical 
and institutional safeguards necessary to meet the requirements of the law of 
evidence.
Applying a legal doctrinal method, this chapter unfolds the legal rules of evi-
dence that should inform the design of technology-enabled community policing 
systems to embody safeguards to protect the admissibility and probative value of the 
records that they collect, transmit and store. Following this introduction, the 
Chapter  discusses the main approaches to the regulation of evidence in 
Europe and highlights the specific admissibility and probative value challenges fac-
ing records collected, transmitted or stored by digital community policing systems. 
 The Rules of Criminal Evidence: The Three Approaches 
in Europe
There are three approaches to the rules of criminal evidence in Europe: (1) The 
freedom of evidence principle; (2) the freedom of evidence principle along with 
rules limiting the discretion of the court; and (3) detailed rules of evidence (Williams 
1998).
 Freedom of Evidence
As a general rule, judges can form their inner conviction about the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused by relying on any piece of evidence presented and discussed 
before them. There are no specific rules regarding the sources, types, admissibility 
or weight of evidence that the judges must use to reach a verdict of innocence or 
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guilt. France is an example of the jurisdictions following this approach. According 
to article 427 of the French Code of Penal Procedure (CPP), “[e]xcept where the law 
otherwise provides, offences may be proved by any mode of evidence and the judge 
decides according to his innermost conviction”. This practically means that judges 
can admit digital evidence as well as evidence such as hearsay testimony—“[w]rit-
ten or oral statements or communicative conduct made by persons otherwise than in 
testimony at the proceedings in which it is offered” (Sopinka 1999, p. 173)—that is 
usually excluded by the rules of evidence in jurisdictions such as the United States 
(Frase 1990). Under the freedom of evidence principle, all evidence including con-
fession is subject to the evaluation of the judge.
The freedom of evidence principle also applies in trials before the Assize Court 
(cour d’assises), which is the main criminal court in France and the only one that 
operates with a jury (Woods 1931). Article 353 of the French CPP liberates the 
judges of the court from following specific rules regarding the fullness or adequacy 
of evidence but requires them “to seek in the sincerity of their conscience what 
impression has been made on their reason by the evidence brought against the 
accused and the arguments of his defence” and to answer the following question: 
“are you inwardly convinced?”
The principle of freedom of evidence gives judges enough flexibility to consider 
whatever available information might be useful to reach a verdict about the guilt or 
innocence of the accused without being overburdened by written rules (Williams 
1998). This ensures that criminals will not escape a verdict of guilt by virtue of a 
loophole in the procedural rules of evidence (Stannard 2015). It in addition helps 
expedite trial time by limiting the opportunities in which lawyers can attempt to 
invoke rules on evidence exclusion (Williams 1998). On the other hand, the princi-
ple of freedom of evidence may create uncertainty in criminal proceedings and may 
encourage the filling of cases even in the absence of material evidence (Wigmore 
1942; Williams 1998).
It is logical for the French criminal justice system to adopt the principle of free-
dom of evidence, because it assigns fact-finding to professional judges, who have 
legal education and training, rather than to jurors, except in the Assize Court 
(Williams 1998). France adopts the inquisitorial legal system in which judges play 
an active role in investigating the facts of the case to develop a personal opinion 
about truth (Pugh 1962).
The principle of freedom of evidence is not without limitations. For instance, 
article 432 of the French CPP explicitly prohibits deriving written evidence from the 
correspondence exchanged between the accused and his/her lawyer. Similarly 
important, courts can exclude evidence whose collection does not conform to pre-
scribed procedures when the law prescribes the penalty of nullity as a remedy of 
such violation and when the violation damages the interests of the accused. For 
instance, according to article 179 of the French CPP, “[t]here is a nullity when the 
breach of an essential formality provided for by a provision of the present Code or 
by any other rule of criminal procedure has harmed the interests of the party it con-
cerns”. This form of exclusion, referred to as substantial nullity (nullités substanti-
elle), is difficult to categorize and is decided by courts on a case-by-case basis 
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(Hodgson 2005). In contrast, in a number of provisions, the French CPP provides 
that the violation of a given procedure, such as the ones designed to protect the 
rights of individuals during domicile search, will result in nullity. For example, 
article 59 provides “[t]he formalities mentioned under articles 56, 56-1, 57 and the 
present article are prescribed under penalty of nullity”. This form of nullity is 
referred to as textual nullity (nullité textuelle) (Rengel 2013). There have been many 
occasions when the court of Cassation excluded evidence not obtained in confor-
mity with the procedures prescribed in the French CCP (Buisman et  al. 2010). 
Further, courts would exclude confessions extracted by the police through subject-
ing the accused to physical abuse (Ma 1999). As a result, legality is explicitly an 
element of evidence admissibility in specific circumstances and in general an ele-
ment that judges will unlikely overlook when formulating their “innermost convic-
tion” about the innocence or guilt of the accused (Leroux 2004).
Besides the requirement of legality, there are other requirements that impact the 
admissibility or weight of a given record as evidence under the French CPP: namely 
the relevance requirement as well as the authenticity and reliability requirement.
A relevant fact is that “either taken by itself or in connection with other facts 
proves or renders probable the past, present, or future existence or non-existence of 
[another fact]” (Stephen 1886, p.  2). While the French CPP does not explicitly 
require the evidence to be relevant in order to be admissible, several provisions in it 
impliedly refer to this requirement. For example, the President of the Assize Court 
has the power to exclude irrelevant records by virtue of article 309. Similarly impor-
tant, the requirement of relevance stems from logic (Thayer 1898; Nzjboer 2000). It 
is a necessary requirement for the right answer to the inquiry (Tillers and Schum 
1991). Judges have a wide power of discretion to evaluate the relevance of the 
record by virtue of article 427 of the French CPP (Pradel 2000; Leroux 2004).
As to the authenticity and reliability requirement, generally a record is authentic 
if it is the record that it purports to be and is reliable if it is trustworthy: “it can be 
treated as a fact in itself” (Duranti 1995, p. 6–7). To be authentic, the record must 
remain unchanged; it must originate from its claimed source; and its extraneous 
information, such as its date, must be accurate (Reed 1990). The record receives its 
reliability from the form and procedures of its creation (Duranti 1995). The date and 
signature are traditionally the required elements in the form (Ibid). They link the 
record, specifically the information or acts contained therein, to its maker and make 
him/her responsible for its content (Ibid). Meanwhile, the procedures of creation 
refer to the different rules regulating how the information or acts are recorded, such 
as the rules assigning the competence to make the record or specifying how it is 
handled (Ibid).
Several provisions in the French CPP refer to the authenticity and integrity 
requirement of evidence, including digital evidence. For instance, article 537 con-
siders official records and reports produced by, inter alia, judicial police officers 
“prima facie authentic evidence” [emphasis added]. Further, articles 56 and 97 pre-
scribe specific measures to be followed in the process of collecting documents or 
electronic data during an authorized seizure: For instance, (1) only specifically 
authorized persons are allowed to examine the documents or electronic data before 
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seizing them; (2) documents and items seized must be promptly entered on an 
inventory and kept in a judicial safekeeping under official seals; (3) when the sei-
zure involves electronic data, the seizure occurs by seizing the physical medium 
containing the data or by making a copy of the data in the presence of the person(s) 
carrying out the seizure.
The issue of the authenticity and reliability of a record is inherently connected to 
the inner conviction of the reasonable judge who, in light of the freedom of evidence 
principle, will have the full discretion in its determination.
 Rules of Evidence
The principle of freedom of evidence is familiar to other jurisdictions in continental 
Europe, such as Germany. Section 244(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure 
(StPO) provides that “[i]n order to establish the truth, the court shall, proprio motu, 
extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the deci-
sion”. Yet, the StPO subjects the principle to greater limitations than those existing 
under the French law by providing rules directing judges with regard to evaluating 
the evidentiary admissibility and probative value of a record. The evidence rules are 
designed to address common evidence law problems that judges encounter in crimi-
nal cases and that would otherwise require extra efforts to address (Williams 1998). 
In addition, this approach keeps to judges enough flexibility to tailor the use of the 
evidence in a way responsive to the specific facts of the case (Ibid). The rules on 
witness evidence in sections 48-71 of the StPO are a good illustration of the extent 
to which it details the rules on the admission and administration of a type of evi-
dence. For example, section 68a of the StPO directs the court with regard to the 
questions that are to be and not to be asked.
Under the StPO, relevance is a requirement for the evidence admissibility. 
Section 244(3) requires the judge to refuse the application to take evidence when 
“the taking of such evidence is superfluous because the matter is common knowl-
edge, the fact to be proved is irrelevant to the decision or has already been proved, 
the evidence is wholly inappropriate or unobtainable, the application is made to 
protract the proceedings, or an important allegation which is intended to offer proof 
in exoneration of the defendant may be treated as if the alleged fact were true”.
Arguably other provisions in the StPO include a legality requirement although 
the StPO does not have a general exclusionary rule regarding illegally gathered 
evidence (Gless 2010). For instance, section 136a provides that “[t]he accused’s 
freedom to make up his mind and to manifest his will shall not be impaired by ill- 
treatment, induced fatigue, physical interference, administration of drugs, torment, 
deception or hypnosis” and that “[m]easures which impair the accused’s memory or 
his ability to understand shall not be permitted”. Accordingly, courts will exclude 
confessions obtained by means of the violations described in the section (Gless 
2010). Overall, the StPO evidence rules must be read along with the rules protecting 
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individuals’ rights and freedoms in the Basic Law of Germany, such as the right to 
privacy in article 10.
The StPO does not explicitly address the authenticity and reliability of evidence 
requirements. However, section 93 describes the measures to be followed in order 
to verify the authenticity and reliability of a document, specifically by requiring a 
handwriting comparison to be conducted by experts. As to electronic records, sec-
tion 41a(1) of the StPO allows for the admission of electronic documents as equiva-
lent to documents if they carry an electronic signature, following the requirements 
of the Digital Signatures Act, and are suitable for processing by the court. Moreover, 
besides electronic signatures, the section speaks about the possibility of another 
statute providing for “the admissibility of a further secure procedure which guaran-
tees the authenticity and the integrity of the electronic document transmitted”. In 
Germany, by virtue of section 244(2) of the StPO, courts will “extend the taking of 
evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the decision”. Hence, they will 
not automatically exclude evidence whose authenticity and reliability is question-
able (The Law Commission 1995). Authenticity and reliability will impact the pro-
bative value of the evidence rather than its admissibility (Ibid).
 Detailed Rules of Evidence
In several European countries, such as England and Romania, evidence law includes 
very detailed rules regarding the admissibility and probative value of evidence. In 
principle, the English law of evidence admits all evidence as long as it is relevant 
and not excluded from admissibility by a statutory or common law exclusionary 
rule or by the discretion of the judge (Keane and McKeown 2016; Leroux 2004). 
Accordingly, evaluating the evidentiary admissibility of a record involves three 
inquiries: whether the record is relevant or not; whether it is excluded by an appli-
cable exclusionary rule; and whether there is any inclusionary exception on the 
exclusionary rule (Roberts and Zuckerman 2010). The English law of evidence has 
several exclusionary rules. For instance, according to section 76 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), the court must exclude a confession, even if it 
is true, when it appears to the court that it was obtained by oppression or was a result 
of “anything said or done” which was likely to make it unreliable, unless the pros-
ecutor relying on the confession proves to the court beyond reasonable doubts that 
it was not obtained through those means. Furthermore, section 78 of PACE autho-
rizes the court to exclude unfair evidence.
This is not to say that the English law of evidence has a general legality require-
ment. Case law has often held that relevance is the only requirement of admissibility 
while legality is not. In Kuruma v The Queen (1955, A.C. 197, p. 203) the House of 
Lords held that “the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible 
is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court 
is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained”. In fact, according to section 
s.76(4) of PACE, even when the court excludes a confession, this will not impact the 
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admissibility of any evidence relating to a fact discovered because of the 
confession.
When a rule of evidence excludes a specific type of evidence, courts will accept 
it if it is subject to an exception to the exclusionary rule. For instance, section 114 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA) provides that hearsay evidence is admissible 
only when it falls under one of the four exceptions provided in the section, such as 
when all the parties of the proceedings accept its admissibility or when the court is 
convinced that its admission is “in the interests of justice”.
As to the authenticity and reliability of evidence, the English law does not statu-
torily address the issue and courts have usually referred to it briefly (Pattenden 
2009). Nonetheless, it is arguable that courts will not admit evidence whose authen-
ticity and reliability are questionable unless there is a legal presumption of authen-
ticity or an agreement to this effect, especially given the strong link between 
relevance and authenticity (Ibid).
In Romania, the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) includes very detailed rules on 
the types of evidence accepted in criminal proceedings, the conditions for its admis-
sion, and the remedy available to the parties of the proceedings when the collection 
of the evidence does not conform to the conditions prescribed in the law. More 
specifically, the CPC places the judicial bodies under an obligation to find the truth 
about the facts of a case or about the suspect by relying on evidence (Romanian 
CPC, art.5). It allows any means not prohibited by law to be used for collecting 
evidence including statements made by suspects or defendants; statements made by 
victims; statements made by witnesses; and documents, expert reports, pictures, and 
physical evidence (Romanian CPC, art. 97(2)). The CPC requires the evidence to be 
both relevant and obtained by legal means to be admissible: a judicial body may 
exclude evidence when it is irrelevant, unnecessary, impossible to obtain or contrary 
to the law (Romanian CPC, art.100). In the same vein, the CPC prohibits the use of 
violence or any coercion in obtaining evidence (Romanian CPC, art. 101). This 
prohibition extends to cover the use of entrapment for the purpose of collecting 
evidence and the use of any means that may affect the person’s capacity to remem-
ber or tell conscientiously and voluntarily facts that can be object of evidence 
(Romanian CPC, art. 101). By virtue of article 102, courts will exclude evidence 
unlawfully obtained.
The CPC does not include a general rule regarding the authenticity and reliability 
of evidence. Hence, courts will have the discretion to determine the admissibility or 
value of the record whose authenticity or reliability is uncertain (Romanian CPC, 
art. 103). However, the CPC refers to the process to be followed in order to ensure 
the authenticity and reliability of records of electronic surveillance activities 
(Romanian CPC, art. 143). Article 138(b) of the CPC treats video, audio or photo 
surveillance as a special method of investigation, and LEAs will have to obtain a 
court order to authorize it after the statutory conditions for granting this order have 
been fulfilled.
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 Digital Evidence Challenges
Users of digital community policing systems can transmit digital records, such as 
videos and pictures, through their mobile devices in the processes of reporting a 
danger or offence. These records can be useful tips that lead LEAs to conduct inves-
tigations and possibly collect other relevant records to the investigations (Burns and 
Conte 2014; Shifrin 1991). Later, prosecutors may rely on such records to establish 
the guilt of an accused before a court. At this stage, the question of the admissibility 
and probative value of those records arises. As the discussion in the previous section 
shows, relevance of the records to the proceedings is key for their admissibility. 
Legality of the records is a requirement for their admissibility in some jurisdictions 
and authenticity and reliability will impact their probative value although statutes 
do not instruct courts to exclude evidence whose authenticity and reliability are not 
established (Allegrezza 2010). Generally, European jurisdictions do not subject 
digital evidence to different rules (Insa 2007). Therefore, it has to meet the require-
ments of the admissibility of traditional evidence and is subject to the same factors 
impacting the probative value of the latter (Leroux 2004).
Establishing the authenticity and reliability of digital evidence is challenging:
[T]he easiness of electronic records creation and the level of autonomy that it has provided 
to records creators, coupled with an exhilarating sense of freedom from the chains of 
bureaucratic structures, procedures, and forms, have produced the sloppiest records cre-
ation ever in the history of record making. Too many persons and too many records forms 
generated in too many different contexts participate in the same transaction; too much 
information is recorded; too many duplicates are preserved; and too many different tech-
nologies are used. In other words; electronic records, as presently generated, might be 
authentic, but they are certainly not reliable (Duranti 1995, p. 9).
The uncertainty regarding the identity of the author of the digital record sheds 
doubts on its authenticity (Chaski 2005; Thomson 2013; Brown 2015). Furthermore, 
given the fragility of the digital record and its vulnerability to alteration, it is diffi-
cult to ensure that it has not been manipulated or altered after its creation (Kerr 
2001; Brown 2015; Solon and Harper 2004). Theoretically, prosecutors may over-
come this challenge by proving the chain of custody of the record (Dubord 2008; 
Brown 2015), which is “a process used to maintain and document the chronological 
history of the evidence;” (Brenner 2004, p.54). It documents the details of every 
instance of interaction with the record: when, where, why and how the record is 
accessed or used and by whom (Giova 2011). Practically, however, proving a chain 
of custody of a digital record that has not been violated from the moment of the 
creation of the record to the moment of its presentation in the court is difficult 
(Brown 2015; Insa 2007).
Moreover, establishing the reliability of the digital device that has produced the 
digital record is another challenge facing the authenticity and reliability of digital 
evidence. It is important to ensure that the electronic device or any of the programs 
responsible for producing, transmitting or preserving the digital record has been 
free from any defects or intrusions that could have compromised its integrity 
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(Thomson 2013). Finally, ensuring the completeness of the digital record is prob-
lematic because there is a risk that it does not include all the actions or events it 
purports to capture (Ibid).
The difficulty associated with proving the authenticity and reliability of digi-
tal records does not mean courts will exclude them at the outset. In England, for 
instance, digital  records have  been admitted “as evidence that speaks for itself” 
(Pattenden 2009). Equally important, securing the authenticity and reliability of 
digital  records is technologically feasible as the research in this field illustrates 
(Kuntze et al. 2012).
 Conclusion
Under the rule of law, the punishment of offenders is possible only when their guilt 
is proven before the judiciary in accordance with specific legal safeguards including 
the rules of evidence law, which are a set of legal and logical rules designed to 
ensure that no one is punished for a crime he/she did not commit. Digital commu-
nity policing systems can help achieve the objective of this law. Users of these sys-
tems can collect, transmit and store digital records relevant to violations of law. 
LEAs can use these digital records as tips to collect further evidence and prosecu-
tors can use them later to prove the guilt of an accused before courts. In the latter 
situation, it is necessary that the digital records meet the law requirements regarding 
the admissibility and probative value of evidence.
In Europe, different jurisdictions follow different approaches towards the regula-
tion of the admissibility and evaluation of the probative value of evidence. For 
instance, France adopts the freedom of evidence principle by which a judge will 
reach a verdict of guilt or innocence of the accused by relying on any evidence pre-
sented and discussed in the trial. In a like manner, the law of evidence in Germany 
adopts the freedom of evidence principle but the StPO subjects the principle to more 
limitations than those existing under the French law. On the other hand, countries 
like Romania have very detailed rules on the types of evidence accepted in criminal 
proceedings, the conditions for its admission, and the remedy available to the par-
ties of the proceedings when the collection of the evidence does not conform to the 
conditions prescribed in the law.
In Europe, jurisdictions do not subject digital evidence to different rules than 
those applicable to traditional evidence, such as written documents. Therefore, 
records collected, transmitted or stored by digital community policing systems will 
have to satisfy the requirements of relevance, legality, authenticity and reliability to 
be admissible and/or to have considerable probative value. In this regard, the authen-
ticity and reliability requirement is the main challenge that the records will have to 
overcome. It is true that, as a general rule, jurisdictions do not statutorily exclude 
the admissibility of evidence when its authenticity and reliability are not estab-
lished. Nevertheless, especially in the jurisdictions applying the freedom of evi-
dence principle, the authenticity and reliability of evidence will have a great 
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influence on the courts’ determination of the value of the evidence, given the con-
nection between the authenticity and reliability of the evidence and other require-
ments of admissibility such as relevance. Therefore, to preserve the probative value 
of the digital records collected, transmitted or stored by digital community policing 
systems, the designers of these systems should consider overcoming the following 
challenges during the design and implementation:
• The challenge of authorship: The systems should incorporate a trait or mecha-
nism that enables the identification of the source, the author or creator, of the 
records as well as the time, date and location of their creation.
• The challenge of alteration and manipulation: The systems should incorporate 
measures that protect the digital records from alteration, manipulation or damage 
during their collection, transmission or storage.
• The challenge of the reliability of the software and device involved in the cre-
ation, transmission or storage of the digital records: The systems should incorpo-
rate measures to ensure that the records created, transmitted or stored are what 
they purport to be.
• The challenge of completeness: The systems should incorporate measures that 
verify whether the digital records have suffered any omissions or they fully cap-
ture the actions or events they purport to capture.
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